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INTERDISTRICT INEQUALITIES IN SCHOOL
FINANCING: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
SERRANO v. PRIEST AND ITS PROGENY
STEPHEN

R. GOLDSTEm t

Rarely has a state supreme court decision received such extensive
publicity and public comment as the recent California Supreme Court
opinion in Serrano v. Priest,' concerning the constitutionality of interdistrict disparities in financing California public school districts. Indeed, one might have to go back to the United States Supreme Court
reapportionment cases to find a decision of any court that has been as
extensively discussed in the press as has Serrano. Most significantly,
the press comment seems to have been uniformly affirmative. The
Serrano result has been popularly hailed as rightly egalitarian and a
significant, if not the significant, step in the struggle for better education
in urban areas. 2 Even those editorial writers who have traditionally
been proponents of judicial restraint have refrained from commenting
adversely upon the court's decision invalidating California's public
school financing system.
In part this absence of adverse comment may be attributable to
the fact that it was the California Supreme Court and not the United
States Supreme Court that decided the case. Yet, the decision's impact
is clearly not confined to California. The California school finance
system is similar in effect to the systems used in 49 of the 50 states,3
and the court avowedly rested its decision on federal equal protection
grounds.' It has also been expressly followed by a federal district court
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1959, LL.B.
1962, University of Pennsylvania. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
15 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
2 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1971, at 17, col. 1; id., Sept. 2, 1971, at 32,
col. 1; at 55, cols. 1, 2; id., Sept. 5, 1971, § 4, at 7, col. 1; at 10, col. 3.
3 Hawaii is the only state without local school district control of education.
HAWAII REV. LAWS §§ 296-2, 298-2 (1968).
4 The court specifically rejected the argument that the California financing system
violated art. IX, § 5 of the California Constitution, which provides for "a system of
common schools." It then stated: "Having disposed of these preliminary matters,
we take up the chief contention underlying plaintiffs' complaint, namely that the
California public school financing scheme violates the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." 5 Cal. 3d at 596, 487
P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609. Despite having thus based its decision on federal
constitutional grounds, the court, in a puzzling footnote, id. at 596 n.11, 487 P.2d at
1249 n.llz 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609 n.1l, then referred to 2 provisions of the California
Constitution requiring that "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have a uniform
operation," CAL. COxST. art. I, § 11, and prohibiting "special privileges or immunities,"
id. art. I, § 21. The court went on to state that:
We have construed these provisions as "substantially the equivalent" of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitu-
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in Minnesota in denying a motion to dismiss 5 and by a three-judge
district court in Texas in holding that state's financing scheme unconstitutional.6 While it is clear, at least at this time, that the Serrano
decision itself will not be reviewed by the United States Supreme
tion. (Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 586, 588, 43
Cal. Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321.) Consequently, our analysis of plaintiffs' equal
protection contention is also applicable to their claim under these state
constitutional provisions.
Id.
Following this, there was no further mention of the California Constitution in
the opinion and almost all authorities cited concern federal law. The court also
devoted considerable effort to avoiding the argument that the federal constitutional
issue had been foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court summary affirmances
in Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd inem. sub norm.
Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969), and Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp.
572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd nmem., 397 U.S. 44 (1970). The California Supreme
Court, of course, would not be limited by a United States Supreme Court interpretation of the California Constitution.
The footnote quoted above, and the explicit citation to Kirchner, however, raise
the issue whether, despite its express reliance on the Federal Constitution, the court
has not also relied on the California Constitution in a way that precludes United
States Supreme Court review.
In Kirchner, the California Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state statute
relating to liability for the care and maintenance of mentally ill persons in state
institutions. 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1964). The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari but vacated and remanded the case to the
California court on the grounds that the California opinion was unclear as to whether
it was based on the federal or state constitutions or both, and that the United States
Supreme Court would not have jurisdiction unless the Federal Constitution had been
the sole basis for the decision, or the state constitution had been interpreted under
what the California court deemed the compulsion of the Federal Constitution. 380
U.S. 194 (1965). On remand, the California Supreme Court stated that although
CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 11 & 21 were generally thought to be "substantially the
equivalent" of the federal equal protection clause, the court was "independently
constrained" in its result by these sections of the state constitution. The court stated
that it had not acted "solely by compulsion of the Fourteenth Amendment, either
directly or in construing or applying state law

....

"

62 Cal. 2d 586, 588, 400 P.2d

321, 322, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 330 (1965).
Although the issue is not completely free from doubt, the California Supreme
Court in Serrano may have written an opinion expressly based on federal law yet
at the same time insulated from review by the United States Supreme Court.
5Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
6 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex.
1971). Procedurally, Rodriguez has developed further than Serrano, as the court
there, after a hearing, declared the Texas financing scheme unconstitutional and
permanently enjoined the defendants, the State Commissioner of Education, and the
members of the State Board of Education, from enforcing it. The court, however,
stayed its mandate and retained jurisdiction for 2 years:
in order to afford the defendants and the Legislature an opportunity to take
all steps reasonably feasible to make the school system comply with the
applicable law .

...

The Court retains jurisdiction of this action to take such further steps as
may be necessary to implement both the purpose and spirit of this order, in
the event the Legislature fails to act within the time stated . ...
Id. at 286. For retention of jurisdiction the court cited cases of judicially imposed
reapportionment plans.
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Court,7 there are many other interdistrict inequality cases in the
process of litigation,8 at least one of which will soon present the United
States Supreme Court with the Serrano problem.9
The primary reason for the favorable reception of Serrano is
probably the growing public eagerness for its result. Unlike many
other societal problems in education and other areas, the concept of
fiscal equality in education is perceived as unambiguously good. It
does not appear to involve the competing views of equality prevalent in
desegregation and community control issues. Nor does it represent the
significant clash between the values of equality and liberty that the desegregation and community control issues may present. The only
visible liberty being curtailed is local economic self-determination, a
value currently of low priority in our society when balanced against
the promise of improving education for the poor and racial minorities.
Fiscal equality also holds out the promise of improving education for
the poor and racial minorities, without raising the fears of personal
adverse effects on the white middle-class family aroused by other proposed policies, such as desegregation. Fiscal equality involves the
movement of inanimate dollars, not live children.1"
Finally, fiscal equality corresponds to a basic American belief that
more money, or money distributed more wisely, can solve major societal
problems such as the current state of public education, and that all
society need do is to have the will to so spend or distribute it. In
Daniel P. Moynihan's terms, Serrano leads one to hope that what may
7See note 4 supra. In addition to the problem of the independent state ground
for the Serrano decision, it is clear that the Supreme Court cannot review it at this
time because it is not a final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970).
8 Also pending before a 3-judge court is the constitutionality of the Florida
school financing system. See Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971), vacating per
curiam Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970). Recent state court
decisions that followed Serrano are: Hollins v. Shofstall, No. C-253652 (Super. Ct.
Maricopa County, Ariz. Jan. 13, 1972) ; Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287
A.2d 187 (1972) ; Sweetwater County Planning Comm. for the Organization of School
Dists. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971). In disagreement with Serrano is
Spano v. Board of Educ., 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1972). The issue is now before
the courts in more than half the states. See Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1972, at 1, col. 6.

9 It appears that the decision in Rodriguez is immediately appealable to the
United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970). If appealed, it would
presumably be heard in the October term, 1972.
10 The Serrano result and metropolitan desegregation, e.g., Bradley v. School
Bd., 40 U.S.L.W. 2446 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 1972), can be viewed as alternative methods
of improving the educational quality of urban minority groups, to the extent that the
argument for metropolitan desegregation rests on a desire to give the black urban
poor access to the tax base of their more affluent white suburban neighbors. Compare
Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971), with Johnson v. San Francisco
Unified School Dist., No. C-70 1331 SAW (N.D. Cal. June 2, 1971). See also
Spencer v. Kugler, 40 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1972) ; United States v. Board
of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1971).
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have been considered a "knowledge problem" is indeed a "political" one,
or better yet, a judicial one. 1
Serrano is unquestionably sound as a matter of abstract egalitarian
philosophy. Nevertheless, there are many difficulties presented by its
legal analysis. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the practical effect
of the decision will be to improve the quality of public education generally, or the quality of urban public education in particular.
I. SCHOOL DISTRICT INEQUALITY AND THE Serrano RESPONSE
A. The Court's Response to IzterdistrictFinancing Differentials
As is true with every state except Hawaii, over 90% of California's public school funds derive from a combination of school
district real property taxes and state aid based largely on sales or
income taxation. Historically the state aid, or "subvention," has been
superimposed on the basic system of locally raised revenue. Although
the state aid component of educational expenditures has been generally
increasing as a percentage of the total expenditures, the local component has remained dominant. California is typical in having total
educational expenditures consist of 55.7 percent local property taxes
and 35.5 percent state aid.' 2
The local component is a product of a locality's tax base (primarily
the assessed valuation of real property within its borders) and its tax
rate. Tax bases in California, as elsewhere, vary widely throughout
the state. Tax rates also vary from district to district.
The state component of school expenditures is generally distributed through a flat grant system, a foundation system, or a combination of the two. The flat grant is the earliest and simplest form
of subvention, consisting of an absolute number of dollars distributed
to each school district on a per-pupil or other-unit standard. Foundation plans are more complicated and have a number of variants. In
its simplest form, a foundation plan consists of a state guarantee to a
I Moynihan, Can Courts and Money Do It?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1972, § E

(Annual Education Review), at 1, col. 3; id. at 24, col. 1.
12 In addition, federal funds account for 6.1% and other sources for 2.7%. These
figures and others given for California in this Article are taken from the court's
opinion in Serrano. 5 Cal. 3d at 591 n.2, 487 P.2d at 1246 n.2, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
606 n.2.
In discussing expenditure differentials, the Serrano court did not indicate whether
or not its figures included federal revenues. Other authorities have excluded federal
revenues from these calculations. This author has elsewhere questioned the validity
of this exclusion. See Goldstein, Book Review, 59 CAIjF. L. REv. 302, 303-04 (1971).
Nationwide, approximately 52% of all school revenue is collected locally, and from
97-989o of local tax revenue is derived from property taxes. Briley, Variation between
School District Revenue and Financial Ability, in STATUS AND IMPACT OF EDUCATIONAL FINANc E PROGRAMS 49-50 (R. Johns, K. Alexander & D. Stollar eds. 1971)
In California, all local school
(National Educational Finance Project vol. 4).
revenues are raised by property taxation. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§20701-06 (1969).
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district of a minimum level of available dollars per student, if the
district taxes itself at a specified minimum rate. The state aid makes
up the difference between local collections at the specified rate and this
guaranteed amount. If the actual tax rate is greater than the specified
rate, the funds raised by the additional taxes are retained by the
locality but do not affect the amount of state aid.
Finally, there are combinations of flat grants and foundation
plans. Under one form of combination plan the flat grant is added to
whatever foundation aid is due to the district:
State Aid = [guaranteed amount fied rate] + flat grant.

local collection at speci-

Under the other combination system, the flat grant is added to the
local collection in initially calculating the foundation grant:
State Aid = [guaranteed amount - (local collection at specified rate + flat grant)] + flat grant.
Under this approach, a district that would qualify for a state foundation
grant equal to, or in excess of, the flat grant does not in effect receive
the flat grant. That grant is superfluous when it serves only to bring
a district up to the foundation level, because a district is always guaranteed the foundation level in any case. The full benefit of the flat
grant goes only to those districts where the local collection at the
specified rate equals or exceeds the foundation guarantee.
The latter combination plan is the system employed in California."
The flat grant is $125 per pupil. The foundation minimum, based on
a tax rate of 1.0 percent for elementary school districts and 0.8 percent
for high school districts,"4 is $355 for each elementary school pupil and
$488 for each high school student, subject to specified minor exceptions. An additional state program of "supplemental aid" subsidizes
particularly poor school districts that are willing to set local tax rates
above a certain statutory level. An elementary school district with an
assessed valuation of $12,500 or less per pupil may obtain up to $125
more for each child under this plan. A high school district whose
assessed valuation does not exceed $24,500 per pupil can receive a
supplement of up to $72 per pupil if it taxes at a sufficiently high rate.' 5
'3

As noted, this results in the quirk that the full effects of the flat grant are

available only to those districts whose revenue at the prescribed rate exceeds the
foundation guarantee. There would seem to be no rational basis for this result. The
Serrano court, however, did no more than mention this fact and there is no indication
that the opinion rested on it.
14 This is simply a computational tax rate used to measure the relative tax bases
of the different districts. It does not necessarily relate to the actual rates levied.
15 There are other minor provisions in the state subvention system. Districts
that maintain "unnecessary small schools" receive $10 per pupil in their foundation
guarantee, a sum intended to reduce class sizes in elementary schools. Unified
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Although the foundation plan does help to equalize available educational funds throughout the state, the relatively low foundation
guarantee nevertheless allows significant disparities among school districts. The Serrano court cited the following statistics for the 19691970 school year for district per-pupil educational expenditures:

Low
Median
High

Elementary
$ 407
672
2586

High School
$ 722
898
1767

Unified 16
$ 612
766
2414

Statistics cited by the court for assessed valuations per pupil also reflected the disparities:

Low
Median
High

High School 17
$ 11,959
41,300
349,093

Elementary
$
103
19,600
952,156

The complaint in Serrano set forth two main causes of action. The
first was that of plaintiff school children residing in all school districts
except the one that "affords the greatest educational opportunity," who
alleged that:
As a direct result of the financing scheme . . . substantial

disparities in the quality and extent of availability of educational opportunities exist and are perpetuated among the
several school districts of the State .

.

.

. The educational

opportunities made available to children attending public
schools in the Districts, including plaintiff children, are subdistricts (those which contain both elementary and secondary schools) receive $20
more per pupil in foundation grants. In addition, a special program attempts to
provide equalization in districts included in reorganization plans that were rejected
by the voters. It gives the poorer districts in the reorganization the effect of the
reorganization to the limited extent of levying a tax areawide, of 1.0% in elementary
districts and 0.8% in high school districts. The resulting revenue is then distributed
among the individual districts according to the ratio of each district's foundation level
to the areawide total revenue. Thus, in these rare circumstances of voter-rejected
reorganization plans, poorer districts share in the higher tax bases of wealthier
districts in their area. The districts are, of course, free to tax themselves above the
1.0% or 0.8% level and retain all additional revenue. 5 Cal. 3d at 593 n.8, 487 P.2d
at 1247 n.8, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 607 n.8.
16 Id. at 593 n.9, 487 P.2d at 1247 n.9, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 607 n.9.
17 Id. Note that these figures and those in the text accompanying note 16 supra,
represent the extremes and thus may be skewed, as extremes often are. In this case
a major skewing mechanism may be an abnormally low number of public school
students in a given district. Even outside the extremes, however, the discrepancies
in California are substantial. These assessed valuation per pupil figures also assume
uniform assessment practices. This assumption was not discussed by the court. The
discrepancies were much less substantial in Texas but the system was invalidated
nonetheless. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D.
Te-x. 1971).
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stantially inferior to the educational opportunities made available to children attending public schools in many other
districts of the State .... '8
The financing scheme was alleged, therefore, to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and various clauses of the
California Constitution.
The second cause of action, brought by the parents of the school
children, as taxpayers, incorporated all the allegations of the first claim.
It went on to allege that as a direct result of the financing scheme,
plaintiffs were required to pay a higher tax rate than taxpayers in many
other school districts to obtain for their children the same or lesser
educational opportunities.
The complaint sought: (1) a declaration that the system as it
existed was unconstitutional; (2) an order directing state administrative officials to reallocate school funds to remedy the system's constitutional infirmities; and (3) retention of jurisdiction by the trial
court so that it could restructure the system if the legislature failed to
do so within a reasonable time.' 9 The trial court sustained a general
demurrer to the complaint and the action was dismissed. The dismissal
of the complaint for failing to set forth a cause of action was appealed
to the California Supreme Court.
The California Supreme Court stated the issue in the first line of
its opinion:
We are called upon to determine whether the California
public school financing system, with its substantial dependence
on local property taxes and resultant wide disparities in school
revenue, violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 °
The court immediately went on to hold:
We have determined that this funding scheme invidiously
discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality
of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents
and neighbors. Recognizing as we must that the right to an
education in our public schools is a fundamental interest which
cannot be conditioned on wealth, we can discern no compelling
state purpose necessitating the present method of financing.
We have concluded, therefore, that such a system cannot withstand constitutional challenge and must fall before the equal
protection clause.2 '
18 5 Cal. 3d at 590, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
19 Id. at 591, 487 P.2d at 1245, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
20 Id.
2
1Id.

at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
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In so holding, the California court employed the "new equal protection" analysis. Under this doctrine, certain types of legislative
classifications require a higher level of state justification to pass judicial
scrutiny than is required under the traditional "rational basis" equal
protection test. This doctrine holds that if a suspect classification is
employed, and the classification pertains to a fundamental interest,22
then the classification violates the equal protection clause unless it is
necessitated by a compelling state purpose. A fuller discussion of the
Serrano court's use of this doctrine follows.
B. The Choice of a Standard of Equality: Response to
Activist Legal Scholarship
The most striking element in the California Supreme Court's
holding was its reliance on the relationship between the wealth of a
By "wealth" the
school district and its educational expenditures.
tax
basis
28)
per
pupil or other
court meant taxable wealth (property
unit. Yet, as stated above, the local component of school financing is
a product of taxable wealth and tax rate. A district's expenditures
may be low because it is low in taxable wealth or because it chooses to
tax itself at a low rate, or both. Why, then, did the court focus on
wealth differences as the constitutional vice, rather than on disparities
in expenditures, regardless of cause?
22 It is unclear whether the court regarded the fundamental interest and suspect
classification tests as operating in conjunction with each other as stated in the text
or as operating independently. Compare id. at 612, 487 P.2d at 1261, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 621, with 5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P.2d at 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615. To the extent
the court suggested that either test, operating independently, would trigger the "special
scrutiny" review of state action, it appears to be an inaccurate view of the present
state of the law as applied to state actions other than racial classifications.
The invariable formulation of the doctrine as applied to wealth classifications
requires both wealth classification and impairment of a fundamental interest in some
varying combination. See Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211, 4214 (U.S. Feb. 24,
1972) ; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-30 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
But see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See
generally J. CooNs, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARIMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC

EDUCATION
EDUCATION].
23

339-446 (1970)

[hereinafter cited as

PRIVATE WEALTH

AND

PUBLIC

Serrano and its progeny have been predicated on the assumption of the exclusive use of the real estate property tax for local education financing. As stated in
note 12 supra, however, nationwide property taxes constitute 97-98% of local taxes
for education and thus are almost the exclusive but are not the exclusive means of
local financing. Indeed, by 1968-1969, 22 states and the District of Columbia authorized the use of local nonproperty taxes by local school districts. ALTERNATIVE
PROGRAMS FOR FINANCING EDUCATION 186 (1971) (National Educational Finance
Project vol. 5). While this still amounted to less than 3% of local education taxes
nationwide, in a given state the amount could be sufficiently significant that the
Serrano analysis premised on exclusive real estate taxation would be inapplicable.
For example, in Pennsylvania local nonproperty taxes in 1968-1969 produced a mean
revenue per pupil of $101.30 in central city districts. Id. 187.
Local nonproperty taxes include occupational, utility, and other excise taxes, as
well as local sales and income taxes. Tax bases for such taxes would be much more
difficult to calculate than is a given locality's real property tax base.
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To understand this, one must know something about the legal
literature that predated Serrano. The literature in this field, particularly the book Private Wealth and Public Education,2 exemplifies
a current wave of consciously activist scholarship, written with an
avowed bias, and aimed at producing specific legal results. This new
breed of writers, not content with pure scholarship, actively engages in
the litigation process to accomplish their aims. 25 This activist legal
scholarship--of a very high caliber-produced the legal formulations
manifested in Serrano.26
Serrano apparently adopted as the constitutional rule what was
denominated as Proposition 1 in Private Wealth and Public Education: 27 "The quality of public education may not be a function of
wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole." 21 Proposition 1
itself was a response to prior debate about interdistrict disparities in
educational offerings. Recently there has been increased concern with
inequalities in government services, especially as they affect the poor.
In particular, society has become increasingly concerned with the deplorable condition of urban public education. It has been argued that
a major cause of this condition is the relative lack of resources available
to urban school districts as compared to their more affluent suburban
24 Supra note 22.
25 Coons and Sugarman, for example, filed amicus briefs in Serrano and
Rodriguez.
26 Although the court acknowledged its reliance on Coons, Clune & Sugarman
by citations throughout the opinion, it cited a law review article, Coons, Clune &
Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State
Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. Rxv. 305 (1969), rather than the more comprehensive analysis in PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 22. The
reason for this is not clear. This may reflect only the opinion writer's relative access
to the two works. It may also reflect the court's sensitivity to the reader's relative
access to the two works. Finally, it might be suggested that it represents a possible
reflection of the difference in esteem, in California, between the California Law
Review and the Harvard University Press.
27 The following discussion of Proposition 1 and district power equalizing is
based upon, and some parts are taken entirely from, an earlier analysis of Private
Wealth and Public Education by this author. Goldstein, Book Review, 59 CALIF.
L. REV. 302, 304-10 (1971).
28 PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 22, at 2 (emphasis
omitted). Proposition 1 is, however, never directly quoted by the Serrano Court.
The federal court in Van Dusartz, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971), which expressly
relied on Serrano, did quote Proposition 1 and explicitly accepted it as the constitutional standard. Id. at 872 & n.1. Somewhat less clearly the 3-judge court in
Rodriguez seemed to adopt Proposition 1 as the constitutional rule.
One caveat must be stated regarding the Serrano court's acceptance of Proposition
1 as the constitutional test. As will be discussed at length, text accompanying notes
30-44 infra, Proposition 1 and Serrano do not require equality of expenditures.
Neither, however, is Proposition 1 satisfied by equality of expenditures. If equal
expenditures were achieved by differential rates applied to differential tax bases,
that is, lower tax base districts achieving the same revenue level by employing higher
rates, Proposition 1 would not be satisfied. At this point Proposition 1 leaves
education as its concern and becomes completely taxpayer oriented. Despite the
taxpayer orientation in Serrano, see text accompanying notes 86-91 infra, it is unlikely
that the Serrano court would go this far. Throughout the opinion, the court emphasized differential educational expenditures.
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neighbors. Moreover, there has been increased recognition that plans
for improving urban education through such alternatives as integration,
decentralization and community control, or compensatory education
are, in the final result, highly dependent on the availability of greater
resources for urban school districts.
Although the exact relationship between financially poor school
districts and poor people, particularly the urban poor, is unclear,2 9 the
existence of large wealth discrepancies among school districts is undeniable. The disparity in the quality of education, as conventionally
measured, between urban and suburban school districts is also apparent.
Thus the existing system of educational financing has been increasingly
condemned as intolerable. However, there has existed substantial disagreement on methods of relief. Opponents of judicial intervention
have argued against court action to invalidate the current system: first,
for lack of a workable judicial standard; secondly, because an equality
concept might result in a downward leveling of expenditures when the
real need is to improve low quality; thirdly, because judicial relief would
result in centralization of educational financing; and fourthly, because
an equality requirement that prevented local school expenditures above
the state norm would be either unworkable or would result in substantial middle class exodus from the public schools."0
Proposition 1 was an avowed attempt to respond to these criticisms. By adopting it, the California Supreme Court has apparently
limited its decision to wealth-derived educational differentials and has
not required equal expenditures statewide. On this basis of decision,
there are a number of alternative school financing systems that would
meet the court's constitutional standard. Among these is abolition of
local school districts and their replacement with a completely statewide
system. Short of that, centralized state financing that raises and distributes all funds could be coupled with local district administration of
the schools. Centralized financing, however, is not required under the
Serrano rule invalidating only wealth-derived differentials. A general
school redistricting that equalized wealth among school districts would
satisfy the decision and at the same time allow the present system of
financing and administration to continue. Finally, there is the innovative suggestion proposed in Private Wealth and Public Educa20 See notes 65-75 infra & accompanying text.
30 See Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional
Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHI L. REv. 583 (1968). For the views of the
proponents of judicial intervention, see A. WIsE, RIcH ScHooLs, POOR ScHooLs:
THE PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 143-59 (1968); Horowitz &
Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public Education and Public
Assistance Programs From Place to Place Within a State, 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rzv. 787
(1968); Kirp, The Poor, the Schools, and Equal Protection, 38 HARv. EDUC. REv.
635 (1968).
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tion---district power equalizing-a system that allows differential expenditures among school districts, while removing the effect of
differential tax bases on these expenditures.
Under district power equalizing, existing school districts would
have funds available for education based on their tax rate regardless
of their tax base. A school district would be free to choose any tax
rate it desired and its available funds-defined as "x dollars per educational unit"-would be established by the state for any given tax
rate. In a simplified model, a district power equalizing scheme might
appear as follows:
Tax Rate
1
1
2

2o2
3

Available Funds
$ 400 per educational task unit
600
800
1000
1200

A district with a low tax base whose chosen tax rate produced less
revenue than the state prescribed amount would receive state funds to
make up the difference. A district that produced more revenue than
the state prescribed amount at its chosen rate would be required to pay
the excess to the state.
The scheme of power equalizing as a means to satisfy the requirements of Proposition 1 has been attacked on equalitarian grounds. It
requires merely that district wealth disparities be eliminated as a factor
in financing education, thus still permitting districts to spend more by
taxing more. What is in fact required, it is argued, is statewide
equality of learning opportunity to the extent achievable by statewide
financing."' The Serrano decision is subject to the same attack insofar
as the court adopts an equal- wealth formula, rather than an equal
expenditure formula.
It is not indisputably clear, however, that the court has rejected
the equalization of expenditures formula. Although the language
quoted above, and other statements in the opinion seem to accept the
equal wealth standard, it might well be argued that the court decided
only the facts before it-that the existing financing scheme was unconstitutional-and did not go so far as to endorse an equal wealth standard
or reject the argument that an equalization of expenditures standard
is constitutionally required. Indeed, in response to an argument that
autonomous local decisionmaking was so important a value that it
justified the existing system, the court stated: "We need not decide
31 See, e.g., Silard & White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Education: The
Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 7,
26-28, 30.
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whether such decentralized financial decision-making is a compelling
state interest, since under the present financing system, such fiscal free
will is a cruel illusion for the poor school districts." 32 Other evidence
of the court's possible acceptance of the equal expenditure formula as
being constitutionally required is its specific recognition that many of
the values of local choice could still be preserved under a spending
equalization formula that centralized financing but localized administration of schools.
The court's possible failure to rule out a constitutional command
of expenditure equalization may also be explained by the fact that tax
base, not tax rate, is the main determinant of local educational expenditures. Available statistics, in California and elsewhere, indicate
that districts with smaller tax bases, such as Baldwin Park, tax themselves at higher rates than do richer districts, such as Beverly Hills,
even though their total yield is not as great.3 3 Therefore, the Serrano
court may have assumed that Proposition 1, which removes the wealth
factor, would produce generally equal offerings among school districts,
and thus left until another day the issue of what happens if it does not.
These reasons, however, are not sufficient to explain the very
strong equal wealth emphasis in the Serrano opinion. The most
logical reading of the decision is that the court did adopt the formula
of equal wealth rather than the equal expenditures formula as its
constitutional command. The probable explanation for this is twofold.
First, an expenditure equalization standard would cause problems with
compensatory education and other programs that would devote extra
funds for the education of disadvantaged students. The proponents
of equal expenditures are also in favor of this degree of inequality and
struggle valiantly to make these concepts consistent. Perhaps their
struggles are successful. It is much easier, however, to avoid the inconsistency by not adopting an equal expenditure test in the first place.
The second basic argument in favor of an equal wealth standard is
that it permits a local school district to choose how much it wishes to
spend on the education of its children. The desirability of retaining this
local choice responds to basic federalist, pluralist values of diversity and
local decisionmaking-a concept termed "subsidiarity" in Private
Wealth and Public Education.'4 In Serrano the state argued that the
32 5 Cal. 3d at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
33 Id.; PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 22, at 127-50. See
also ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS FOR FINANCING EDUCATION 81-101 (1971) (National

Educational Finance Project vol. 5).

34 PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION,

supra note 22, at 14-15. Subsidiarity

is "the principle that government should ordinarily leave decision-making and administration to the smallest unit of society competent to handle them."

Goldstein, Book Review, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 302, 306 (1971).

Id. 14.

See also
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existing school financing system was constitutionally valid because it
incorporated just these values. 5
The court's response, while rejecting the state's argument, shows
sensitivity to the idea of local choice:
[S]o long as the assessed valuation within a district's
boundaries is a major determinant of how much it can spend
for its schools, only a district with a large tax base will be
truly able to decide how much it really cares about education.
The poor district cannot freely choose to tax itself into an
excellence which its tax rolls cannot provide. Far from
being necessary to promote local fiscal choice, the present
financing system actually deprives the less wealthy districts
of that option. 6
The Serrano court did recognize that local choice in nonfiscal
educational matters might still be retained under centralized financing;
yet this limited degree of choice is not sufficient. As a purely
theoretical issue it is difficult to determine the value of retaining local
control over educational spending, particularly when weighed against
the possibility of continuing expenditure inequalities, which the retention of local choice produces. But this issue is not merely a matter of
political theory. Rather, adoption of the equal wealth standard in
Serrano is an implicit recognition of the fact that, in light of our
history and traditions, judicial or legislative decrees cannot be used to
prevent localities from trying to get better education for their children
by raising more funds locally.
A pre-Serrano law review article" by Silard and White, which
dismissed district power equalizing in one paragraph as not producing
equality of educational offerings, ended discussion of its equalization
solution, centralized financing, by adding: "The [centralized financing]
mechanism might also be formulated in such a way as to retain a local
option to surtax for additional education." " This "local option" is
obviously a device to allow localities to spend more on education than
the centrally determined norm, and thus produce inequalities in offering.
35 The court quoted the state's argument that:

"[flf one district raises a lesser amount per pupil than another district,
this is a matter of choice and preference of the individual district and reflects
the individual desire for lower taxes rather than an expanded educational
program, or may reflect a greater interest within that district in such other
services that are supported by local property taxes as, for example, police
and fire protection or hospital services."
5 Cal. 3d at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620.

36Id.
37
38

Silard & White, supra note 31.
Id. 29 (emphasis added).
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Despite their very strong commitment to egalitarian principles, proponents of judicial action in this field obviously cannot resist the notion
that local districts should retain the option to spend more on education.
It is this fact, deeply embedded in our public consciousness, that primarily explains why the Serrano court did not and would not require
9

spending equality.3

The existence of this public sense raises a further question about
the limits of Serrano. Is the Silard and White system--centralized
financing with a local option surtax-consistent with the California
court's constitutional standard? While the spending equalization
standard is not required under Serrano, it remains to be seen what
minimal remedies are consistent with the standard actually adopted by
the court, and thereby determine the limits of its holding. Any appearance of consistency between Serrano and the surtax proposal is nothing
more than a semantic illusion, unless the surtax were based on power
equalization or another scheme that removed differential tax bases as
an element in a district's ability to surtax itself. Otherwise the surtax
has the same constitutional defect as that condemned in Serrano because
the quality of a child's education remains dependent on the district's
wealth. In fact, the surtax system is the present system in Californiait is the foundation plan. The justifications for the surtax are the
reasons given above for preferring district power equalizing over
expenditure equalization-subsidiarity and the deeply embedded feeling
that one cannot preclude a locality from taxing itself more heavily, if
it so chooses, to get better education for its children. But, if one
accepts the Serrano equal protection reasoning, these concepts and this
felt need are only sufficient to justify the surtax if the surtax is necessitated by a compelling state purpose. It is not clear that these factors
even provide a sufficiently compelling purpose to justify district power
equalizing. Even if they do, however, they would not justify a nonpower equalized surtax. Such a surtax is not necessary, because its
objective of allowing local choice can be achieved by power equalizing.
Thus, because it has the Serrano-determined constitutional vice of differential expenditures related to differential tax bases that power
equalizing does not have, it must be invalid under Serrano.
The proposal of a centralized financing system with a local surtax
option also suggests that the evils of school finance might be remedied
merely by increasing the minimum spent per child. Following this line,
3o This public feeling was clearly expressed in the response to the Serrano decision in a New York Times editorial. After hailing the case on egalitarian grounds,

the editorial abruptly concluded with the assertion that the ideal solution for school
financing lies in centralized state financing "without discouraging additional investments by education minded communities in the betterment of their schools." N.Y.
Times, Sept. 2, 1971, at 32, col. 1.
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a system that increased the California foundation plan, say from $500
to $1000, might be said to accomplish the goal of providing to each
student, regardless of the district in which he resides, an adequate level
of educational expenditure. Such a constitutional standard would be
based not on equal protection but on a constitutional right to an affirmative minimum provision of services similar to that suggested by
Professor Frank Michelman and discussed later in a footnote to this
Article." One of the most fundamental objections to this concept of
minimum provision of services is the inability of courts to determine
at what point the minimum of a given service has been reached. In
the hypothetical above, $1000 was used, but why should the minimum
not be $1200? Indeed, why is the current minimum of approximately
$500 unacceptable? Apparently the California legislature believed it
to be sufficient.
One might simply argue that a minimum of $500 is unreasonable,
a determination that a court could make without having to determine
exactly what the minimum should be. Such an approach, however,
ignores the need for judicial standards as illustrated by recent
Supreme Court history. As happened in reapportionment between the
Baker v. Carr4 1 "rationality" test and the Reynolds v. Sims 4 2
"one man-one vote" test, once a court defines a principle it is difficult to
stop short of setting a minimum standard.43
Lastly, one may argue that, under a system with a sufficiently
large state minimum, the surtax is merely a minor deviation that will be
permitted under Serrano in the same manner that the United States
Supreme Court has allowed a degree of deviation from mathematical
precision under its one man-one vote rule. The two situations are not
comparable, however. The surtax, unlike the unavoidable, inconsequential deviations of voting district mathematics, is a policy decision
to allow some school districts to make their schools unequal to schools
in other districts. The more apt reapportionment analogy is deviation
for policy preferences, such as protecting rural areas. Such policy
40 See note 84 infra; Michelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the
Fourteenth Amendment, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HAgv. L. REv. 7 (1969).

41369 U.S. 186 (1962).
42 377

U.S. 533 (1964).

43 Professor Michelman recognized this when he hypothesized the application of
his minimum protection theory to education. After suggesting that each child was
constitutionally entitled to a minimum provision of education, he concluded that
minimum provision would mean equalization. He based this conclusion on the fact

that education is valued because of its relevance to competitive activities; thus the
minimum required for A must be determined in relation to what his competitor, or
future competitor, B, is receiving. While there is merit in this position, Professor
Michelman overstates it when he thereby equates the minimum with no substantial
inequality. The fact that he does so, however, is indicative of the standardless nature
of the minimum provision theory. Professor Michelman thus is driven to equalization
in order to provide a standard. Michelman, supra note 40, at 47-59.
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preferences have been rejected by the Supreme Court in the reapportionment cases. 44 Of course, in school financial equalization there will
be deviations from mathematical certainties as a result of such things
as differential labor costs and economies of scale. Such deviations
occur because of a practical inability to achieve perfect equality. The
surtax is not such a deviation. It represents a conscious decision to
create inequality.

II. DISTRICT WEALTH

DISCRIMIINATION:

A SUSPECT

CLASSIFICATION?

While the California Supreme Court's reliance on an equal wealth
formula thereby precludes resort to remedies such as the surtax system,
and limits the holding so that it does not require expenditure equalization, the court's adoption of equal wealth has significance beyond its
force as a limitation. Wealth discrimination was, in fact, the affirmative basis used to invalidate an almost universal school financing
system. The Serrano court cited "wealth discrimination" as one of
the "suspect classifications" that, in conjunction with a fundamental
interest, triggered the "new equal protection." '5
The Serrano court held that "this funding scheme invidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality of a child's
education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors," " that
is, the wealth of his school district. The factual data relied on by the
court in reaching this result, however, consisted of disparities in tax
bases and school expenditures among school districts. Therefore, two
basic questions must be answered before this holding is related to the
data:
1. What is the relationship between school expenditures and the
"quality" of a child's education?
2. What is the relationship between poor districts--districts with
low taxable wealth-and poor people?
A. The Relationship of Expenditures to Educational Quality
The problem of relating levels of educational expenditures to
quality of education is a persistent and annoying one. For one thing,
there is no consensus on what the desired educational outputs are, or
how educational quality should be measured. Secondly, there is very
44 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-68 (1964). But see Abate v. Mundt,
403 U.S. 182 (1971).
45 5 Cal. 3d at 597, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
46 Id. at 590, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
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little empirical data to support a finding of an affirmative relationship
between expenditure levels and measurable educational outputs.
The Coleman Report,4" the leading study attempting to correlate
selected educational outputs with various inputs, found little relationship
between expenditure levels and the educational outputs it measured,
when other variables were held constant.4
While the Coleman Report's methodology has been attacked persuasively,49 affirmative data
that dispute its conclusion remain minimal. ° The Coleman Report and
other studies are concerned with spending differentials only within the
relatively narrow range of current school expenditures. The lack of
correlation between expenditure levels and educational outputs in this
range does not preclude the possibility of some absolute minimum of
expenditures being necessary to achieve measurable educational outputs.
Further, this absence of correlation between expenditures and outputs
is more understandable when it is recognized that approximately twothirds of a typical school district's revenues are spent for teacher
salaries."' Differences in teacher salaries are often a function not of
teaching quality, but of such indirectly related factors as longevity and
educational degrees. Differences in salary scales among districts may
be the result of such factors as differential general wage scales and the
bargaining power of teacher unions. The Serrano court discussed the
problem of relating expenditures to quality in a footnote and admitted
that "there is considerable controversy among educators over the relative impact of educational spending and environmental influences on
school achievement .. . .
2
The court avoided the problem in two ways. One was to cite
other cases that have rejected the argument that there is no proof that
47 OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966).

EDUCATION

& WELFARE,

See id. 20-21, 312-16.
Bowles & Levin, The Determinants of Scholastic Achievement-An Appraisal of Some Recent Evidence, 3 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 3 (1968).
48

49 See

50 Some support for a correlation between expenditure level and quality of
education is found in J. GUTHRIE, G. KLEINDORFER, H. LEvIN & R. STOUT, SCHOOLS
AND INEQUALITY (1971).
This support, however, is hardly sufficient to support a

judicial finding of correlation.

Moreover, a recently published reexamination of the

Coleman data by a score of eminent social scientists in a faculty seminar at Harvard

University has confirmed the findings of the original report, while avoiding some of
the original report's methodological problems.

Indeed, this reexamination indicates

that the influence of school expenditures on student achievement is even weaker than
was indicated by the original Coleman Report. See Mosteller & Moynihan, A Pathbreaking Report, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 36-45 (F. Mosteller
& D. Moynihan eds. 1972) ; Jencks, The Coleman Report and the Conventional
Wisdom, in id. 69-115; Smith, Equality of Educational Opportunity: The Basic
Findings Reconsidered, in id. 230-42.
51 Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education, 71 COLU. L.
REv. 1355, 1359 (1971).
52 5

Cal. 3d at 601 n.16, 487 P.2d at 1253 n.16, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613 n.16.
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different levels of expenditure affect the quality of education. 53 Except
for the latest decision in Hobson v. Hansen," discussed below, these
cases have not given a rationale for this rejection.
Secondly, the court relied on the procedural posture of the case.
Since the complaint was dismissed on demurrer, the court countered
the defendant's contention that different levels of educational expenditures do not affect the quality of education with the statement that
"plaintiffs' complaint specifically alleges the contrary, and for purposes
of testing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we
must take its allegations to be true." " It is not clear that this approach
was consistent with the court's earlier statement that the California
procedure is to "treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts
properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact
or law." "' The court did not explain why, for example, the possibility of a causal relationship between expenditures and educational
quality would not be considered a contention of fact. More significantly, the reliance on this procedural posture, if this is what the court
did, means that the issue still remains open for proof-proof that does
not appear to be available.
The authors of Private Wealth and Public Education, in enunciating the equal wealth standard, try to finesse the problem by stating the
issue as equality of resources available to the student rather than as
equality of educational offerings. What is available, they then contend,
are the goods and services purchased by school districts, and there is
no reason to assume that the money spent for these goods and services
is not the appropriate measure of their value."7
The problems may also be avoided in terms of burden of proof.
When A shows that the state is spending more money on B than on
him, the state must respond by demonstrating either that this fact is
53Id. The court cited Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968),
aff'd mem. sub nora. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969), in which a 3-judge
federal court stated, without a supporting citation, in the course of rejecting a
constitutional attack on interdistrict differentials in school financing, "[p]resumably,
students receiving a $1000 education are better educated that [sic] those acquiring a
$600 schooling." 293 F. Supp. at 331.
In another case cited in Serrano, Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D.
Fla. 1970), vacated on other grounds per curiam sub non. Askew v. Hargrave, 401
U.S. 476 (1971), the district court stated: "[I]t may be that in the abstract 'the
difference in dollars available does not necessarily produce a difference in the quality
of education.' But this abstract statement must give way to proof to the contrary
in this case." 313 F. Supp. at 947. No proof on this issue, however, was ever
stated by the court in Hargrave and the opinion goes on not to discuss this, but to
discuss the inability of school districts to raise school revenues under the Florida
system.
54 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971).
55 5 Cal. 3d at 601 n.16, 487 P.2d at 1253 n.16, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613 n.16.
at 591, 487 P.2d at 1245, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605.
5GId.
57 PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDucATION supra note 22, at 25-27.
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irrelevant because A is not really receiving less than B, or that even if
A is receiving less, the differential is still constitutionally permissible.
Available data are insufficient to support a state's assertion that expenditures are irrelevant to educational equality and thus the issue
shifts to a determination of the constitutionality of differential treatment. This burden of proof approach to the issue was apparently the
one taken by Judge Wright in the latest decision of Hobson v. Hansen,"
although there were also elements of estoppel involved in the Hobson
court's reliance on the school administration's own assertions of a
correlation between educational resources and quality of education 0
While the burden of proof argument has appeal as an expedient
solution it is not a completely satisfying basis for judicial invalidation of
a longstanding method of public school financing. From this perspective, arguments for judicial action must be discounted somewhat
by uncertainty about the present system's detrimental effect on the
quality of education, and also, therefore, by doubts of improving education by such invalidation."0
B. The Relationship of Poor Districts to Poor People
The second question raised by the wealth analysis underlying the
Serrano holding centers on the supposed relationship between a school
district's wealth, as measured by its real estate tax base, and the personal wealth of its people. For its wealth classification argument the
court relied on United States Supreme Court "de facto wealth classification" cases in which states have been restricted in imprisoning
58 327 F. Supp. 844, 854-55. The court in Hobson was not concerned with a
correlation between gross expenditures and quality of education, but rather with the
specific differences in expenditures on teacher salaries, rated on a per pupil basis,
between essentially "white" and "black" schools within the District of Columbia.
The quality-expenditure issue in terms of teacher salaries per pupil was posed as the
correlation or lack thereof between quality instruction and higher salaries. Phrasing
the issue as "teacher salary per pupil" also raised the issue of the relationship between
educational quality and class size or student-teacher ratio.
59 Id. at 855.
60 Professor Moynihan has suggested that:

[t]he only certain result that will come from [a rise in educational expenditures, which he states Serrano will produce] is that a particular cadre of
middle-class persons in the possession of certain licenses-that is to say
teachers-will receive more public money in the future than they do now.
Moynihan, Can Courts and Money Do t7, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1972, § E (Annual
Education Review), at 24, col. 1. Note that by ordering equalization of teacher
salaries per pupil between "white" and "black" schools, Judge Wright in Hobson v.
Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971), allowed the school district the choice of
transferring higher paid teachers from "white" schools to "black" schools or reducing
the student-teacher ratio in the "black" schools. Although the evidence of correlation
between class size and pupil performance does not seem significantly greater than
that between average teacher salary and pupil performance, one's subjective sense is
that the class size is the more significant factor to education. Both the intradistrict
and racial aspects of Hobson also strengthened the case for judicial intervention.
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indigents for failure to pay fines,; have been required to provide indigent criminal defendants with such things as transcripts 62 and
attorneys for appeal,1 3 and have been precluded from requiring the
payment of a poll tax as a precondition to voting. 4 All of these cases,
however, involved "wealth classifications" that operated against individuals, whereas Serrano involved school districts. The issue in
Serrano would therefore be simpler if the wealth of school districts
coincided with the wealth of its people, thus making poor districts
aggregates of poor individuals.
Available statistics, however, do not indicate this hypothesized
relationship between poor districts and poor people. One recent study
of 223 school districts in eight states indicates that there is no substantial pattern of differences in real estate tax basis per pupil among
seven categories of school districts: major urban core cities, minor
urban core cities, independent cities, established suburbs, developing
suburbs, small cities, and small towns.6 5 It is true that the three-judge
federal district court which invalidated the Texas school financing
system in Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District
found that "those districts most rich in property also have the highest
median family income and the lowest percentage of minority pupils,
while the poor property districts are poor in income .

..

66

The

basis for this finding was an affidavit submitted by plaintiffs and cited
by the court. As a basis for the court's conclusion, this was a questionable source; a careful reading of the data contained in the affidavit
creates grave doubts about the validity of its conclusions.6
61 Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) ; Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
62 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
63 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
64 Harper v. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
G5 See ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS FOR FINAicING EDUcATION 83-89 (1971)

(National

Educational Finance Project vol. 5).
66 337 F. Supp. at 282 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
67 The Rodriguez court cited the affidavit as showing a median family income of
$5900 in the 10 districts with the highest tax base per pupil and $3325 in the 4
districts with the lowest tax base per pupil. Id. at 282 n.3. The following are the
study's figures:
State & Local
Per Cent
Median Family
Market Value of
Revenues Per
Minority
Income From
Taxable Property

Pupil

Per Pupil

1960

Pupils

Above $100,000
(10 Districts)

$5900

8%

$100,000-$50,000

4425

32

544

$50,000-$30,000
(30 Districts)

4900

23

483

$30,000-$10,000
(40 Districts)

5050

31

462

79

305

(26 Districts)

3325
Below $10,000
(4 Districts)
Affidavit of Joel S. Berke at 6 (footnotes omitted).

$815
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In the amicus brief filed in Serrano by the Harvard Centers for
Educational Policy Research and for Law and Education, an attempt
was made to avoid the absence of statistics correlating poor people and
poor school districts, by defining the injured class as those poor people
who also live in poor school districts.

68

Although the amicus brief

never explains the basis for this definition of the injured class, it may
be argued that the people in this narrow group are singularly disadvantaged because they have neither the advantage of a high tax base
as do the poor in rich districts, nor the mobility " and private school
alternatives of the more wealthy residents of poor school districts. The
flaw in this approach is that defining the injured class in these terms
considerably weakens the wealth classification argument. The system
no longer can be said to discriminate against the poor but only against
a certain segment of the poor. In fact, when the school finance system
is viewed from this perspective, the chief beneficiaries of the system
when the class is so defined would be those poor families who live in
rich districts. Not only do they have a resource advantage over those
who live in poor districts, but also, they get more school for fewer tax
dollars than do their more wealthy neighbors in the rich districts. The
relative advantage of the poor in rich districts is further increased by
the very factors that arguably are the unique disadvantage of the poor
in poor districts-their lack of mobility and private school alternatives.
As with the wealthy in poor districts, the wealthy in rich districts are
not as dependent on their district's public schools as their less affluent
neighbors and thus not as benefited by living in a rich district under
the present system.
Finally, to focus on aiding the poor who live in poor districts
would probably require greater relief than that offered by Serrano and
the subsequent cases. Under this analysis, the poor in districts that
undervalue education under such equal wealth alternatives as district
power equalizing would be just as disadvantaged as the poor who live
in poor districts today. Their immobility and lack of private school
The 5 category breakdown of school districts seems to be arbitrary, and it is
only this breakdown which appears to produce the correlation of poor school districts
and poor people. Even on this breakdown, however, the correlation is doubtful.
Note the very small number of districts in the top and bottom categories. Even more
significant is the apparent inverse relationship between property value and median
income in the three middle districts, where 96 of the 110 districts fall. While the
family income differences among the 3 groups of districts are small, they may be
even more significant if categories are weighted by the number of districts in each.
At the very least, the study does not support the affirmative correlation of poor
school districts and poor people stated by the court and the affiant; this is, however,
the study the court relied upon, and it is apparently the only study which purports
to show such correlation.
68 Brief for the Center for Educational Policy Research and the Center for Law
and Education as Amici Curiae at 3 n.1.
69 Id. 6 n.5.

1972]

INEQUALITIES IN SCHOOL FINANCING

alternatives would still uniquely disadvantage them as compared to the
wealthy inhabitants of the same districts, and the poor in districts with
greater school expenditures. A focus on the poor in poor districts
would, therefore, require equalization of expenditures to avoid the
hypothesized legal wrong.
Another complication in applying a district wealth classification
theory is that any correlation that does exist between poor school districts and poor people may vary from state to state. Also, it is quite
possible that there is a greater correlation between the rural poor and
poor school districts than there is between the urban poor and poor
school districts. If this correlation is necessary to the legal analysis, the
legitimacy of the Serrano result might very well vary from state to
state. A decision by the United States Supreme Court, however,
attempting to differentiate among the states, would be entirely inappropriate. It would be most unwise to have basically similar state
systems held invalid or valid depending on where the state's poor lived,
or more accurately, depending on judges' views of the difficult
statistical analysis demonstrating a correlation between poor people and
poor school districts.
A related failure to demonstrate a relationship between blacks or
other racial minorities and poor districts is particularly disappointing
to proponents of judicial action for whom the presence of such correlation would have significant legal effects. 70 One report notes that in
California, over half the minority pupils reside in districts with above
average assessed wealth per pupil. 71
The absence of a correlation between poor or racial minorities and
poor districts may be attributable to, among other factors, the failure
of the property tax as a measure of a man's actual wealth. Most significantly, however, the reason for the absence of correlation is the
70See, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), in which
statistical evidence of discriminatory distribution of municipal services along racial
grounds triggered a "compelling state interest" test.
71 PRIVATE VEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 22, at 356-57 n.47.
The complaint in Serrano alleged that "[a] disproportionate number of school
children who are black children, children with Spanish surnames, children belonging
to other minority groups reside in school districts in which a relatively inferior
educational opportunity is provided." 5 Cal. 3d at 590 n.1, 487 P.2d at 1245 n.1,
96 Cal. Rptr. at 605 n.1. Other than quoting this allegation as part of the complaint,
however, the California court did not rely on it.
The affidavit relied on by the court in Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. at 282 n.3 (see
note 67 supra), however, did state that, of the districts sampled in Texas, the richest
districts had 8% minority pupils while the poorest districts had 79% minority pupils.
Again, however, the validity of this conclusion based on the study's figures is doubtful.
The "correlation" only exists for the 10 richest and 4 poorest districts. This pattern
disappears in the middle groups which include 96 of the 110 districts. Whatever
correlation there is between the percentage of minority people and the tax base
wealth of a school district in Texas may reflect the rural nature of Texas minority
life or some other state peculiarity.
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location of industrial and commercial property, the presence of which
increases a district's wealth by increasing its tax base, without a necessary increase in school population.
These facts raise a basic question of the effect of Serrano and its
progeny. While the case has been hailed on theoretical egalitarian
grounds, many of its proponents are more concerned with the practical
problem of getting more money for urban education. While some
major cities with high concentrations of poor people are financially
poor school districts, others, such as New York, San Francisco, and
Philadelphia, have relatively high tax bases as compared to their respective state averages.72 They also spend more per pupil than their
respective state averages. Therefore, if current expenditures for education were equalized on a statewide basis, major cities in many areas
would have less money to spend than they have now.73 The same
would be true if wealth were equalized with tax rates remaining the
same.
It is possible that equal wealth systems may, by their nature, result
not just in equalization of current expenditures but also in overall
increased spending for education. It may be that under a scheme of
centralized financing it would be politically easier for state legislatures
to raise taxes, and thereby increase total school expenditures, than
it would be for local school board members. The latter are more
visible to the taxpayer and may, indeed, have to get voter approval for
tax increases or bond issues. Under district power equalizing Professor
Brest suggests that, because it is politically impossible for legislators to
vote to take locally collected taxes away from a district, tax rate and
expenditure levels would have to be equalized at the highest figures
previously available-that is, what the wealthiest district produced from
its tax rate.7' The consequence of this would be enormous increases
72Another reason, in addition to the presence of industrial and commercial
property, for the absence of correlation between major cities and poor districts may
be the relatively large number of students in urban areas attending nonpublic schools.
73 An equalization principle that operated beyond the sphere of property tax base
wealth could work against the cities in another area. Local nonproperty taxes,
though limited in significance to a few states, see note 23 supra, may also disproportionately favor urban centers. In a study of Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee for 1968-1969, school districts
were classified into central city, suburban, independent city, and rural districts. It
was found that in 5 of the 7 states (Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Pennsylvania,
and Tennessee) the rural districts received the least amount of revenue per pupil
from such local nonproperty taxes; in 4 of the 7 states (Kentucky, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee) the central city districts received the most revenue per
pupil. The average ranking for the 7 states showed that the central city school
districts on the average received the most revenue per pupil from local nonproperty
taxes, followed in order by suburban, independent city, and rural districts. ALTEIAPROGRAMS FOR FINANCING EDUCATION 186-87 (1971)
(National
Finance Project vol. 5).
t4 Brest, Book Review, 23 STAN. L. REv. 591, 596 (1971).
TIVE
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for education. So enormous, in fact, that Professor Brest uses it to
demonstrate the improbability of any state ever adopting district power
equalizing.
Despite these hopes for a greater investment in education, the
history of state legislative treatment of urban education, the serious
economic difficulties currently facing state government, and the domination of state governments by rural and suburban interests make it
difficult to realistically predict that Serrano will result in greater total
expenditures for education. And if total expenditures do not increase,
then the cities, in their relatively wealthy status stand to gain little from
the Serrano decision. 5
C. "Wealth Classifications" as Applied to School Districts
In addressing the problem of correlating poor people and poor
school districts in its legal analysis, the California Supreme Court first
relied on the procedural posture of the case and noted again that the
complaint alleged a correlation between poor people and poor districts.G
The court did not quote the complaint nor state the basis, if any, given
for the allegation. The court did not rest on this procedural argument,
however, but went on to state:
More basically, however, we reject defendants' underlying thesis that classification by wealth is constitutional so
long as the wealth is that of the district, not the individual.
We think that discrimination on the basis of district wealth
is equally invalid. The commercial and industrial property
which augments a district's tax base is distributed unevenly
throughout the state. To allot more educational dollars to
the children of one district than to those of another merely
because of the fortuitous presence of such property is to make
the quality of a child's education dependent upon the location
of private commercial and industrial establishments. Surely,
this is to rely on the most
irrelevant of factors as the basis for
7
educational financing. 7
There are, however, serious problems with this application of the
wealth discrimination cases to government entities, as distinguished
75 It may aid rural education which would help the rural poor. It may also be
argued that, when relieved of the obligation of financing education, by the adoption
of a centralized financing scheme for education, urban areas will be more able to
raise greater revenues for their other needs. This assumes either that the state
financing scheme will not take the same revenue that the urban areas now take for
education, or that taxpayers will be more responsive to local taxation for other needs
if their education taxation goes to the state. Such assumptions appear unrealistic;
present indications are that statewide financing for education will continue to be
based on the same real property tax as that on which local taxation presently is
based.
70 5 Cal. 3d at 600-01, 487 p.2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
77 Id. at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252-53, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13 (footnote omitted).
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from individuals. Since district wealth is measured by the real estate
tax base, and the development of a district's real estate is a variable
factor, the possibility of voluntary "poverty" is more acute for government entities. Throughout the opinion, the court assumed that a
district's wealth was a "fortuitous" given, beyond a district's control,
and not subject to voluntary choice.
While this may generally be correct, it is increasingly true in our
environmentally conscious age that a rural or suburban district might
voluntarily exclude industrial or commercial development that would
increase its wealth by increasing its tax base, without a corresponding
increase in its school population.7" Under centralized school financing
this district would not be deprived of school revenues, because revenue
would be independent of local decisions affecting the tax base. Under
an equal wealth alternative, such as district power equalizing, a decision to exclude new development would likewise not affect revenues,
which would be based on a district's choice of tax rate, not wealth. Yet
this choice would be logically indistinguishable from the choice of tax
rates, with its corresponding benefit or detriment to the district's school
revenues, permitted, and indeed encouraged by district power
equalizing. 79
Perhaps it is desirable that districts be able to choose to remain
at a low level of wealth without adversely affecting school revenue.
This would have the beneficial effect of freeing a locality from the obligations of economic development, thus benefiting the area ecologically.
On the other hand, it may be unfair to treat bucolic areas that choose
not to expand rapidly the same as highly developed areas that have
attendant congestion, pollution, and other problems that create a heavier
tax burden for the urban dweller. Additionally, widespread decisions
not to allow local development could seriously undermine a program of
decentralization of industry and commerce. These economic and social
effects of Serrano obviously need more exploration than the courts and
commentators thus far have offered.
The wealth classification precedents employed by the Serrano
court present another problem. The principle contained in this group
78 School districts, as special function governmental units, rarely are delegated
powers broader than those necessary to administer the school and raise funds by
taxation and bond issues. General function units, such as municipalities and townships,
are usually the smallest entities delegated the power over development suggested in
the text. Yet, to the extent that general function units coincide with school districts,
or to the extent that the smaller units have significant political power within the
general unit, one may accurately speak of school district political choices.
70 Some practical differences, of course, are that a tax rate choice can be redetermined on a periodic basis, is unambiguous, and is clearly visible; whereas wealth
choices have more enduring consequences, may be ambiguous as to their basis, and
of low visibility.
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of United States Supreme Court precedents is ambiguous. In the
criminal procedure cases the Supreme Court required the free provision
of transcripts so and attorneys I" on the basis of the indigency of the
accused. 2 On the other hand, the Court struck down the use of the poll
tax as a precondition to voting in all cases, without regard to financial
ability to pay the tax." The United States Supreme Court has subsequently cited these cases indistinguishably as "de facto wealth classifications," without apparent recognition of the difference between saying
that no one can be made to pay for a given service, and saying that one
who cannot afford to pay for a given service cannot for that reason
alone be deprived of it.84
80 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
81 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
S2 See also Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S.
395 (1971), relieving only indigents of the penalty of imprisonment because of their
inability to pay fines; Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), relieving only
indigents of the obligation to pay court fees and costs incidental to a divorce
proceeding.
83 Harper v. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ; see Lindsey v. Normet,
40 U.S.L.W. 4184 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1972), in which the Court held unconstitutional an
Oregon statute that required a tenant appealing an eviction judgment to post a bond
for twice the rental value of the premises from the commencement of the action in
which the judgment was rendered until the final judgment on appeal. In so holding,
the Court invalidated the high bond requirement for all tenant-defendants, regardless
of their ability to pay the bond.
See also Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1972), concerning
the validity of high filing fees for entry into Texas nominating primaries. The
decision is ambiguous as to whether the Court held the system unconstitutional as
applied to all candidates, including those who could raise the high fees, or only held
that those who, because of their indigency, could not raise the high fees had to be
relieved from doing so. The Court did stress the issue of the "inability" (without
defining the term) of some candidates to pay the fee and thus indicated that it could
be constitutionally permissible for Texas to maintain its general fee system and
except only those with this "inability."
84 Professor Frank Michelman, in his article, supra note 40, cited by the Scrrano
court, has argued persuasively that these cases are better understood as substantive
due process "minimum protection" cases rather than as equal protection cases. The
distinction between "minimum protection" and "equal protection" is set forth by
Michelman as "vindication of a state's duty to protect against certain hazards which
are endemic to an unequal society, rather than vindication of a duty to avoid complicity in unequal treatment." Id. 9 (emphasis omitted). Minimum protection thus
means state fulfillment of those just wants (or fundamental rights) that our society
cannot constitutionally accept as being subject to normal market risks of nonsatisfaction. This changes the focus of inquiry from "wealth classification" to the determination of what are just wants and what is meant by their nonsatisfaction.
Justice Harlan adopted the Michelman approach in his concurring opinion in
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259 (1970), and employed it for the Court in
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), over the objection of Justice Douglas.
Justice Harlan's attempt to shift the Court to the Michelman due process approach
has apparently been unsuccessful. See Bullock v. Carter, 40 U.S.L.W. 4211 (U.S.
Feb. 24, 1972).
In discussing the minimum protection thesis, Professor Michelman notes the
difference in treatment discussed in the text between the poll tax and criminal procedure cases. He does not, however, appear to offer a rationale for this difference.
Michelman, supra note 40, at 24-26. He suggests that under his minimum protection
theory, the state's obligation is normally satisfied "by free provision to those and only
to those who cannot satisfy their just wants out of their own means." Id. 26. Nor
would his theory require a graduated schedule of payments above the indigency
threshold. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Williams v. Illinois pointed
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The former formula of requiring no payment from anyone has
the advantage of encouraging all-rich, poor, and in-between-to avail
themselves of the service. This is the aim, for example, of free public
education and, perhaps, the reason for voiding the poll tax as a prerequisite for voting. On the other hand, an exemption from payment
only for the poor results in a greater redistribution of wealth than does
a no-payment principle.
To view the problem only in terms of those who can pay all or
those who can pay nothing is also to oversimplify. One basic prerequisite is a determination of what level of sacrifice is required before
one can say that a given individual or group is "unable" to pay for a
service. Again, the leading cases have not dealt with this pervasive
problem. Perhaps the level of sacrifice required of an individual can
also be related (inversely) to the degree that society desires that everyone avail himself of the service; that is, the more society wants the
service used, the less sacrifice is required for it."
Even this formula
may need reevaluation to the extent that sacrifice is also considered to
be a significant measure of the value of a service to an individual and
recognition of that value by the individual increases the societal result
desired.
The ambiguous result presented by the individual wealth discrimination cases is compounded when applied, as in Serrano, to an
aggregation of individuals-a school district. In this setting, level of
sacrifice may become useless as a guideline for determining when to
apply the no-payment principle. Governmental units may have a
greater array of demands on resources than do individuals; districts
may be able to reallocate priorities in a way that individuals cannot.
Arguably, street cleaning or hospital construction can always be cut
back to pay for education. More significantly, a poor district's ability
to raise its taxes or create revenue through borrowing may be so much
greater than the ability of a poor person to raise revenue that the issue
of level of sacrifice becomes meaningless.
The California Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of deriving from the wealth classification precedents a rule that, as applied to
districts, would define the limits of sacrifice--determine which districts
could not, and therefore need not, pay. One response by the court was
out that the logical consequence of the Court's equal protection theory would require
a graduated schedule of payments for those above the indigency level. 399 U.S. at
261.
85 Under Professor Michelman's theory, Michelman, supra note 40, absent the
"remote" possibility that one might deliberately waive his claim to the satisfaction of
a just want, a person is always entitled to satisfaction of his just wants regardless
of the sacrifice he is or is not willing to make to attain such satisfaction. Id. 14.
He does not, however, satisfactorily explain why this is so.

INEQUALITIES IN SCHOOL FINANCING

to assert that "as a statistical matter, the poorer districts are financially
unable to raise their taxes high enough to match the educational offerings of wealthier districts." 6 The authority given for this statement
was an unquoted reference to a Legislative Analyst study. The court,
rightly, was unwilling to rest on that.87 Rather, it relied primarily on
the proposition that even if poorer districts could achieve expenditure
parity by higher tax rates, "the richer district is favored when it can
provide the same educational quality for its children with less tax
effort." 88
This statement suggests, that as applied to districts, the evil to be
cured is not merely absolute deprivation, but relative disadvantage in
ability to pay. This theory goes well beyond the de facto wealth cases
that relieved only indigents of the obligation to pay for certain
services. s9 Obviously, within the nonindigent category, the wealthier
can purchase the service with less effort than the less wealthy. But the
precedents do not require free provision of services to all or graded
fees based on the ability to pay of those above the indigent cutoff line.
When applied to school districts, a constitutional standard of
graded ability to pay becomes an even greater innovation than if it
86 5 Cal. 3d 599-600, 487 P.2d at 1251, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 611.

87
Under the California financing system there is no limit on the rate at which,
with voter approval, a district can choose to tax itself. Thus, there is no legal limit
on a district's ability to raise its revenue. This may be contrasted with the situation
in Florida which was presented to a 3-judge court in Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp.
944 (M.D. Fla. 1970), vacated on other grounds per curiam sub norn. Askew v.
Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971). Florida, in its "Millage Rollback Act," provided
that, in order to qualify for state subvention, a school district could not tax itself
at a rate greater than 10 mills. The district court accepted the argument that this
limit was invalid because it put a limit on tax rates (or penalized districts for high
rates), thus precluding school districts with lower tax bases from producing the same
revenue as those with higher bases. The district court invalidated this limit on the
grounds that there was no rational basis for it. In this the court was patently in
error. The state does have a rational purpose in preserving its own sources of
revenue and protecting the taxpayers from overtaxation by their local school districts.
The court did accurately recognize, however, that the limit meant that districts
with lower tax bases could not, even by taxing themselves more, equalize school
expenditures with wealthier tax base districts. Yet, there is a paradoxical effect
here. Florida argued in the United States Supreme Court that the limit was intended
to be, and was, equalizing in a way that benefited poorer school districts. It had
this effect, because for each percentage increase in tax rate, the wealthier district
could produce more dollars per pupil than the poorer one. To illustrate this, consider
the hypothetical case of 2 school districts, A with $100,000 assessed valuation per
pupil and B with $50,000 assessed valuation per pupil. If a 1.0% limit were put on
both A and B, A could produce $1000 per pupil and B, $500, a difference of $500.
By contrast, if there were no limit, and both A and B taxed at 1.5%, A would have
$1500 and B, $750, a difference of $750, and so on. Thus, while holding A down,
the limit also holds down the possible dollar divergence between A and B.
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case, on the question of whether
the district court should have refused to exercise jurisdiction under the abstention
doctrine.
88 5 Cal. 3d at 599, 487 P.2d at 1251, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
89 It would also go beyond the court's apparent limitation of Proposition 1 to
cases in which there are expenditure differentials, and underlines the taxpayer orientation of Proposition 1. See note 28 supra.
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were applied to individuals. When dealing with school districts we
are dealing with taxation. Let us assume, for example, equal spending
per pupil among school districts. Each school district raises its required revenue by dividing its expenditure total by the number of its
inhabitants (or the number of its families). It then assesses each
inhabitant (or family) a per capita share of the total revenues required
and levies a tax accordingly.

If the state is redistricted so that ag-

gregate individual wealth of each district is the same, the system clearly
would not violate the Serrano holding because no school district, qua
district, would have to make a greater effort than any other to raise the
required revenues. Nevertheless, is this the relevant issue?
Burdens of taxation fall not on school districts, but on taxpayers.
Even though districts are equalized in wealth consistent with Serrano,
individuals or families are not. It would make no difference to the poor
taxpayer who had difficulty meeting his tax burden, that there were an
equal number of poor people with the same difficulty in other school
districts. If the school districts in the example did vary in the aggregate
wealth of their residents this system might violate Serrano; one could
say that it was easier for the school district with greater aggregate
wealth to raise its revenue than for the poorer one to do so. This
approach still misses the point. The real problem is the individual taxpayer's difficulty in paying his tax bill. If Serrano labels relative
deprivations among districts unconstitutional, then does its logic not
require elimination of disproportionate sacrifice among those who pay
the tax? Does the former proposition even make any sense without
the latter?
If there is a constitutional vice created by the differential ability of
taxpayers to meet their obligations, does this then mean that proportional, or even progressive, taxation is constitutionally compelled? It is doubtful that the Serrano court meant to suggest this
outcome. ° Nevertheless, without such a conclusion it is difficult to
understand why it is unconstitutional to have a system whereby one
district can more easily raise revenue than another. It is indeed
probable under present financing systems, including that of California,

that the average resident of a rich district pays higher taxes, in terms
90 The complaint contained counts by both students and parent taxpayers. The
court's entire analysis was directed to the student plaintiff count, however. In
addressing itself, at the end of the opinion to the dismissal of the taxpayer count,
the court did not discuss the independent claims of the taxpayers, qua taxpayers,
that, being in a poor district, they were required to pay taxes at a higher rate to
secure the same or less educational expenditures. It reversed the dismissal of the
taxpayer count solely on the basis that the taxpayer plaintiffs had incorporated the
unequal education allegations of the student plaintiffs into their count, and that, under
California law, they had standing to assert the students' educational interests. 5 Cal.
3d at 618, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
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of gross dollars, for his schools than does the average resident of a
poor district, despite the fact that the resident of the rich district is
taxed at a lower rate." This may be the result of the higher assessed
valuation and, perhaps, larger average property holdings of the individual taxpayers in the rich district. A correlation may even exist
between the amount of tax dollars paid by the average resident of a
district and the educational expenditures of that district. If this is so,
the difficulty is not with disproportionate payments but with inequitable taxation, not only in the hypotheticals above, but also in the
existing financing schemes. The logic of Serrano, which invalidated
these existing financing schemes, may therefore require the wealthy
taxpayer to bear a greater burden than just having to pay more tax
dollars than the poor. Instead it may demand at least a proportional
tax system, and possibly one that is progressive.
The difficulties of relating the wealth of individuals to the wealth
of districts, of applying wealth classification precedents to districts, and
of finding a logical stopping place for the equality concepts involved,
are not the only problems with the wealth classification analysis of
Serrano v. Priest. In fact, the entire foundation of the court's constitutional argument may well have been destroyed by a United States
Supreme Court decision which the Serrano court disturbingly ignored.
In James v. Valtierra92 the Supreme Court implied that even the
existence of "invidious classifications on the basis of wealth" are insufficient to trigger the compelling interest standard of the new equal
protection.
In Valtierra,the Supreme Court upheld a California constitutional
provision that no low-rent housing project could be constructed by a
state public body unless the project had been approved by a majority of
those voting at a local election. Refusing to apply strict scrutiny, the
Court upheld the mandatory referendum on the ground that it was
rationally. related to the legitimate purpose of achieving popular participation in expenditure decisions. Justice Marshall, in a vigorous
dissent, noted that the mandatory referendum provision discriminated
solely against the poor. "Publically assisted housing developments
designed to accommodate the aged, veterans, .

.

. or any class of

citizens other than the poor, need not be approved by prior referenda." " Nevertheless, the Court ignored Douglas, Harper, and
91 In addition, taxpayers might very well be paying for the education of their
children in the prices they pay for their homes, as well as in their tax payments.
To the ex-tent that the quality of education in a given district is disproportionately
high in relation to real estate taxes paid by the home owners of the district, this
fact should be reflected in the price of the district's homes.

92402 U.S. 137 (1971).
93

Id. at 144 (footnote omitted).
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other cases that had deemed wealth classifications or discriminations
against the poor as inherently suspect.14 The Valtierra decision casts
an unavoidable shadow over the first half of the constitutional analysis
employed in Serrano v. Priest.
III.

EDUCATION:

A

FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST?

A. Relationship Between Fundamentality and Impairment
of an Interest
The inherently suspect wealth classification argument is only onehalf of the California Supreme Court's constitutional attack on school
financing. The court also relied on its conclusion that education is
one of those fundamental interests that, when conditioned on wealth
classifications, will trigger special scrutiny requiring a compelling state
interest. The court concluded that education is a fundamental interest
based on its importance, and its similarity to interests previously held to
be fundamental. The court's analysis proceeded on the unstated
assumption that having already found a suspect trait-wealth classification-if it is determined that education is fundamental, then the system
of education financing here involved must meet a compelling interest
test to survive constitutional scrutiny. This analysis was developed,
however, without any attempt by the court to correlate the various
reasons for determining education to be fundamental with the constitutional vice here perceived, unequal educational expenditures based on
differential tax bases among school districts.
The Serrano court seems not to have perceived this as an issue at
all. It was not an issue in the criminal process and voting cases decided
by the United States Supreme Court and discussed above,95 because
those were cases of total deprivation of the service involved. When
the effect of state action is total deprivation of the service to the individual, whatever fundamental aspects of the service exist are necessarily
eliminated." On the other hand, where a service is only impaired
rather than totally withheld, it would seem necessary to determine
whether or not the impairment does affect the basis of the fundamentality of the service.
94 See notes 61-64 supra.
95 See notes 80-84 supra & accompanying text.
96 It may be possible for a service to be held fundamental based solely on general
societal benefit or externalities unrelated to any particular individual enjoying it.

Because society's interest would be in the level of the service enjoyed by people in
the aggregate, arguably this interest would not be impaired by inequality among
society's components. If this were so, a total deprivation limited to a number of
individuals might not impair the bases of fundamentality. This would seem, however,
to be a very rare situation of fundamentality, and has not yet arisen in any litigation.
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As an illustration, assume that a state decided to provide all
students with free education only through eighth grade, and thereafter
to charge fees so that only those who could afford to pay could attend.
In analyzing this hypothetical in terms of the fundamentality of education, one might conclude that all the attributes of education that make
it fundamental are satisfied by attendance only until eighth grade. If
that were so, the fundamentality of education would be irrelevant to
the constitutionality of any state decision on post-eighth grade education. In the context of Serrano, such an analysis would require determination of the relationship between the various grounds for the
court's conclusion that education is fundamental, and the inequalities
of interdistrict expenditures based on differences in taxable wealth
among districts.
B. Is Education a FundamentalInterestf
In its analysis of education's fundamentality, the California
Supreme Court first recognized that there was no direct authority for
the proposition that education is such a fundamental interestY7 The
court then went on to make three basic arguments for the fundamentality
of education, based on:
1. the importance of education to the individual and society;
2. a comparison of education with the rights of criminal defendants
and voting rights that have been held to be fundamental; and
3. the distinguishing of education from other governmental functions that might arguably be as fundamental as education.
1. The "Importance of Education" Argument
The court first argued for the fundamentality of education because
it is "a major determinant of an individual's chances for economic and
social success in our competitive society; . . . [and] a unique influence

on a child's development as a citizen and his participation in political
and community life." " In support of these statements the court did
not cite any social science data but rather relied on language in prior
cases, principally the well-known statements in Brown v. Board of
Education99 concerning the importance of education in today's world.
As stated above, however, the court did not relate these attributes
of education to the effect of interdistrict disparities in expenditures. Its
Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
Id. at 605, 487 P.2d at 1255-56, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.

975
98

99347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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only reference to the issue was an assertion that, while California
precedents "involved [only] actual exclusion from the public schools,
surely the right to an education today means more than access to a
classroom." 100 For comparison the court quoted language in Reynolds
v. Sims,"°' where the Supreme Court asserted that the right to vote
is impaired not only by bars to voting but by dilution of power by malapportionment. Sims, however, is not relevant to the issue posed. The
real issue in the voting case concerned individual political power, an
interest clearly and directly impaired by the evil to be remedied-malapportionment. There is no a priori clear connection between those
characteristics of education quoted above by the court to establish its
fundamentality, and financing differentials; nor do existing data show
such a connection.
In terms of an individual's social and economic success, there are
data, although hardly incontrovertible, correlating length of school
attendance and economic attainment. 0 2 However, such data do not
correlate economic or social attainment with differential expenditures
and, as indicated above, the whole issue of correlating economic inputs
and educational outputs is, at best, unclear. As to responsible citizenship there again are no empirical data to show a correlation with
differential expenditures. One's a priori judgment here might be that
there is no such correlation.
2. Education Compared to Previously Recognized
Fundamental Rights
The second part of the court's argument that education is fundamental was a comparison of education with those rights the United
States Supreme Court already has held to be fundamental: various
rights of criminal defendants and voting. The court recognized the
uniqueness of an individual's interest in liberty which operates in the
criminal procedure area, but suggested that education might well be
as important because it has "far greater social significance than [such
procedural protections as] a free transcript or a court-appointed
lawyer." '0' Except for an aside that education may reduce the crime
rate, however, the Serrano court did not really try to equate education
with the rights of criminal defendants. Nor should it. The protection
of the procedural rights of criminal defendants is not solely recognition
of a unique right to liberty but a recognition of the need for protection
100 5 Cal. 3d at 607, 487 P.2d at 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 617 (footnote omitted).
101 377 U.S. 533, 562-63 (1964).
0 2
1 See EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENT IN AN URBAN SOCIETy (M. Levin & A. Shank
eds. 1970), which contains summaries and analyses of a number of studies.
103 5 Cal. 3d at 607, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
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against the ultimate state attempt to curtail that liberty. The individual, in classic terms, is defending himself against the state. This
protection of citizen from government is the essence of the constitutional restraints contained in the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth
amendment. Unlike the state's function of giving children an education, in the criminal process cases the state fulfills its function by
taking something-the liberty of the criminal. Thus these cases do not
support the proposition that there are fundamental affirmative rights to
the provision of government services.
The right to vote is an affirmative right ensured by the state; it is,
however, the ultimate political right in a democratic society in a way
that makes it sui generis. Voting ensures the right to all other rightsincluding education-to the extent achievable through the political
process. Public education, though certainly relevant to political access,
is not intrinsic to democracy. Finally, the most obviously distinctive
fact about both criminal procedural safeguards and voting is that they
find expression in the structure of the Federal Constitution in a way
10 4
that education does not.

3. Education Compared to Other Government Functions
In addition to extolling education and comparing it with acknowledged fundamental rights, the court in Serrano felt compelled to distinguish education from other services and interests. This ability to
find education unique is central to its fundamentality. If everything is
fundamental, nothing is. Moreover, the uniqueness of education is an
essential limitation on the holding in the case. The court was most
anxious to refute the argument that if differences in spending on education attributable to wealth differentials among geographical areas are
unconstitutional, then so are similar differentials in other governmental
services.
In attempting to distinguish education from other governmental
services the court relied on five factors: 105
1. Education is necessary to preserve an individual's opportunity,
despite a disadvantaged background, to compete successfully in the
economic market place, thus maintaining the existence of "free enterprise democracy."
2. Education is "universally relevant." Every person benefits
from education though not everyone finds it necessary to use other
governmental services like the police or fire department.
104 See

Brest, supra note 74, at 606.

105 5 Cal. 3d at 609-10, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19.
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3. Public education occupies much of an individual's youth-between ten and thirteen years. Few government services have such
"sustained, intensive contact" with the individual.
4. No other government service molds the personality of society's
youth as does education.
5. Education is compulsory.
Again, there is the difficulty of relating these distinguishing
features of education to spending differentials. The unproven relationship of educational spending to social and economic success has already
been discussed.' 8 The universality and prolonged nature of education
were used expressly to distinguish it from police and fire services. The
universality of public education is overstated, however. Although there
are economic limitations on its use, the alternative of private education
is available. More significantly, police and fire protection are also
universal and sustained. Their protective attributes do not consist
solely of responding to cries of distress, but consist also of the security
present on a daily, continuous basis in an individual's surroundings.
Thus, they cannot be said to be less universal or of a shorter duration
than education.
Reasons four and five do distinguish education, at least in degree,
from police and fire. This fact does not satisfy the question of what
relationship these factors have to differential expenditures. The major
thrust of the argument that education molds personalities and that it
does so with the force of governmental compulsion behind it, would
appear to be directed not against financing differentials, but against the
danger to a free society in having the government effectively control
and monopolize this crucial mind forming process. As such it would
argue much more for the easier availability of diverse educational experiences, for example, through a tuition voucher system, than for
equality of expenditures."'
The compulsory nature of education merits further discussion. 08
It was argued that education is fundamental to the individual because
See text accompanying notes 98-102 supra.
107 It may be argued that the personality molding function of education is
peripherally related to first amendment rights. The difficulties of relating this factor
to a need for equal expenditures would still apply to the argument, however.
108 In assessing the applicability of Serrano on a nationwide basis, it should be
noted that education is not universally compulsory in this country. Mississippi and
South Carolina do not have compulsory school attendance laws and Virginia has a
local option system. Moreover, compulsory school attendance is generally limited to
those between the ages of 7 to 16, whereas one is entitled to attend school generally
from ages 6 to 21. See Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority
to Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA.
106

L. REv. 373, 393-94 n.74 (1969).
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by making it compulsory the state has designated its importance. On
analysis, however, this does not seem convincing. The reasons for
making education compulsory are two: (1) people might not otherwise
avail themselves of this service; and (2) the value of freedom of choice
is less applicable here because the choice of school attendance would
not be the child's, but his parents'. This latter, parens patriae reason
presumes that the state is no worse a decisionmaker for a child than
are his parents, and that a state choice of compulsory schooling provides
a foundation for later choice by the child.
The first reason, that education is compulsory because otherwise
people would not avail themselves of the service, does not primarily
demonstrate a judgment of importance to the individual. Indeed, the
need to make education compulsory to be certain that all will avail
themselves of it might indicate its relative unimportance to the individual; an opposite determination that there is no need to make a
service compulsory could reflect the belief that all individuals, recognizing the importance of the service, would use it.
The "importance" reflected in the societal decision to make education compulsory does not represent the value choice of the individual,
but rather, of society. It may be that the court was here finding the
individual's interest in education to be fundamental because the external benefits of education are valuable to society. The flaw in that
approach is that society has already decided what benefits it wants from
education by legislative determination; it does not need judicial
intervention.
Nor does the second reason for making education compulsorythe parens patriae reasoning-necessarily indicate a judgment of education's unique importance to the individual. Rather, it relates to the
peculiar situation of the child, an individual for whom someone else,
parent or state, must make a choice. 0 9
While the reasons for making education compulsory do not therefore argue that education is fundamental, there remains the significance
of compulsory attendance itself.
Intially, it should be remembered that enrollment in public school is
not required. The option of private schooling is constitutionally protected."' On the other hand, private school is a viable option only for
those who can easily afford it, or who feel strong social, political, or
religious needs that persuade them to make the sacrifice necessary to
pay for private schooling. The Serrano court stated that the freedom
09 The validity of these rationales for compulsory school laws has been challenged in the recent decision of State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539,

cert. granted, 402 U.S. 994 (1971).
110 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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to attend private schools "is seldom available to the indigent. In this
context, it has been suggested that 'a child of the poor assigned willynilly to an inferior state school takes on the complexion of a prisoner,
complete with a minimum sentence of 12 years.' " "' While this statement embodies some underlying truths, it falls short of persuasiveness
when applied to interdistrict differentials in expenditures.
As discussed above, the correlation between expenditure levels and
quality of education is unclear," 2 and there is no demonstrated correlation between "a child of the poor" and school districts with low
real property tax bases." 3 Moreover, the argument that compelled
attendance requires equal expenditures seems to be premised on a type
of "right to treatment"-the notion that restriction of freedom for a
specified purpose obligates the state to satisfy that purpose." 4 Yet this
right would only require a minimum level of treatment to justify
curtailing a child's liberty, or more realistically, his parents' liberty.
Such a minimum right to treatment may not be in question at all under
the California foundation plan guarantee and, if it is, it is subject to
the problems discussed above of court determination of the minimum
level of a foundation guarantee system. A child compelled to go to a
poor school (rather than not compelled to go to school at all) is not
hurt by that compulsion vis-A-vis another child compelled to go to a
better school. He is only hurt by that compulsion if that poor school
is worse than no school.
In discussing the uniqueness of education, the Serrano court, while
trying to distinguish education from police and fire protection, did not
even consider a comparison between education and provision of the
essentials of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter. Such a comparison would seem imperative, for in Dandridge v. Williams 15 the
United States Supreme Court upheld welfare grant restrictions on a
traditional rational basis test, not the compelling interest test employed
by the Supreme Court in protecting fundamental interests. This was
done despite prior dictum that subsistence was a fundamental interest. 116
The Dandridge opinion does not expressly deny that subsistence
is a fundamental interest. Rather, it states that welfare legislation,
1115 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619 (quoting from Coons,
Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for
State Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 305, 388 (1969)).
112 See text accompanying notes 47-52 supra.
113 See notes 65-67 supra & accompanying text.
114 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Symposium
-The Right to Treatment, 57 Gao. LJ. 673 (1969).
115 397 U.S. 471 (1970).

116 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1969) ; Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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when not involved with a constitutionally protected freedom such as
interstate travel, is not subject to a compelling interest test because it
is "a state regulation in the social and economic field

.

...

, 1

Whether welfare regulation is not subject to a compelling interest test
because it does not involve a fundamental interest or because it does
involve economic and social regulation, the result in Dandridge
creates difficulties for applying a compelling interest test in
Serrano. It is hard to argue that an affirmative right to education
is more important than an affirmative right to subsistence. Education
also shares the status of welfare as being primarily an economic and
social regulation despite its avowed mind-forming purpose. Most of
the reasons given by the Serrano court for the fundamentality of education relate to economic or social factors. Moreover, as noted by
Professor Brest, "it is not obvious that educational finance systems
embody economic judgments that are any less complex, intuitive, and
ultimately nonjusticiable than those inherent in welfare legislation." 118
117397 U.S. at 484; accord, Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
.18 Brest, supra note 74, at 615. The recent Supreme Court decision in Palmer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), in which the Court upheld the right of a city to
close its municipal swimming pools rather than operate them on an integrated basis,
is also relevant to the issue of the fundamentality of education. In so holding, the
Court distinguished prior cases refusing to permit a school district to close its schools
in order to avoid a desegregation order. The California Supreme Court quoted a
statement of the majority opinion in Palmer distinguishing swimming pools from
schools: "Of course that case [a school closing case] did not involve swimming
pools but rather public schools, an enterprise we have described as 'perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments.' Brown v. Board of Education,
supra at 493." 5 Cal. 3d at 609 n.26, 487 P.2d at 1258-59 n.26, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
618-19 n.26.
That quotation was taken out of context by the California court, and when the
entire case is reviewed, it is clear that the majority opinion and a number of other
opinions in the case purposefully refused to draw a distinction between schools and
swimming pools that would give greater constitutional protection to the former.
The quotation cited above was from a footnote in the Pahner opinion in which
Justice Black, writing for the Court, sought to distinguish a prior summary affirmance
of a lower court decision invalidating Louisiana statutes empowering the governor to
close any school ordered to integrate, or to close all schools in the state if one were
integrated. The first difficulty with the quotation is that the sentence following it
in the Palmer footnote stated: "More important, the laws struck down in Bush were
part of an elaborate package of legislation through which Louisiana sought to maintain public education on a segregated basis, not to end public education." 403 U.S.
at 221 (emphasis added).
Moreover, the principal school closing case discussed in Palmer was Griffin v.
County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), an opinion by Mr. Justice Black that
invalidated school closings in one Virginia district to avoid desegregation while other
schools in the state remained open. In distinguishing Griffin, Justice Black did not
even mention a special status for schools, but rather relied exclusively on other
differences between that case and Palmer, principally the fact that Griffin did not
involve a complete shutdown.
In a concurrence, Mr. Justice Blackmun did indicate that he saw a difference
between schools and swimming pools. He stated as one of the 3 factors that influenced
him in reaching the conclusion that swimming pools could be closed: "The pools
are not part of the city's educational system. They are a general municipal service
of the nice-to-have but not essential variety, and they are a service, perhaps a luxury,
not enjoyed by many communities." 403 U.S. at 229. While this statement dis-
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UNCERTAIN PORTENT FOR

EDUCATION AND EQUAL PROTECTION

Serrano's "fundamental interest" analysis of education is doubtful
both logically and in terms of Supreme Court authority. Yet one cannot deny education's importance or avoid the conclusion that society
must carefully scrutinize its distribution. The moral case is strong for
a doctrine of equal educational opportunity that would limit differential
treatment of educational entitlement. The questions that arise in
adopting Serrano and a federal constitutional standard as the remedy
for this moral need are not answered solely according to one's view
of the importance of education. There remains for studied consideration the wisdom of yielding this role to the courts, and of attempting
to cure societal problems with broad constitutional precepts.
The California Supreme Court, finding an inherently suspect
wealth classification as well as a fundamental interest in the school
financing system, required that the system's inequities be justified by
a compelling state interest. The court was clearly correct in finding
that the system, when compared with its equal wealth alternatives,
could not withstand this stricter equal protection test. The question
remains, however, whether an equal wealth alternative like district
power equalizing that still permits geographic disparities can itself
survive a compelling interest test. For the reasons stated above concerning the pervasive societal sense that one cannot prevent people from
trying to obtain a better education for their children, it is probable that
district power equalizing could withstand strict scrutiny. This conclusion, however, is far from certain." 9
tinguishes schools from swimming pools, it does not distinguish education from police,
fire, welfare, or other common municipal services.
Moreover, in their respective dissents in Palmer, both Justice Douglas and
Justice Marshall rejected any special status for schools that distinguishes them from
swimming pools. Justice Douglas stated: "I conclude that though a State may discontinue any of its municipal services-such as schools, parks, pools, athletic fields,
and the like-it may not do so for the purpose of perpetuating or installing apartheid
or because it finds life in a multi-racial community difficult or unpleasant." Id. at
239. Justice Marshall also equated schools with swimming pools or golf courses in
conceding that a state could close them if it had a proper basis to do so.
119 The equal wealth formulation, which permits district power equalizing, is
easiest understood as a constitutional attempt to equalize educational expenditures,
with some inequality permitted as an accommodation to other interests. This is the
equal protection formulation discussed in the text above, and used by the Serrano,
Van Dusartz, and Rodriguez courts.
One could argue for the equal wealth standard independently of equalization of
expenditures, however. Such an argument would have to support a constitutional
norm that each student, or each taxpayer, is entitled to live in a district that has an
equal resource base for education. Such a norm is difficult to construct and neither
the California Supreme Court nor the authors of Private Wealth and Public Education
in their development of Proposition 1 have even attempted to state or support it.
A recent article by Professor Ferdinand P. Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause
in Public Education, 71 CoLum. L. Rnv. 1355, 1402-12 (1971), does make just such
an argument. He states that lower tax base districts require greater taxpayer
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On the other hand, it is doubtful that the Serrano holding requires
this stricter equal protection test to justify an equal wealth system like
district power equalizing. Serrano employed the compelling interest
test because it found a combination of a wealth classification and a
fundamental interest. 120 District power equalizing satisfies the former
test since the revenue it produces is based, not on district wealth, but on
district tax effort. District power equalizing, then, would not have to
meet a compelling interest test, and could be upheld on only the rational
basis analysis.
This conclusion, however, points up the fundamental theoretical
problem in the Serrano approach. Viewed from the perspective of the
child and his family's interest in equal education, the current system
and district power equalizing suffer the same inadequacies. Neither is
a wealth classification; they are both residence classifications in their
actual effects. To the extent that expenditures are related to educational quality, the child receives a poorer education whether he lives in
a poor district or simply one that undervalues education.
sacrifice than wealthier districts to raise educational revenue. Since the acceptability
to voters of tax proposals "varies inversely with the burden," id. 1407, "voters in
low tax base districts who seek to increase educational appropriations are forced to
assume a proportionally heavier burden of electoral persuasion than those who wish
to achieve an identical goal in the more affluent districts." Id. This electoral burden,
which varies from district to district, bears no reasonable relationship to a legitimate
state policy and thus denies equal protection under a Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962), voting rights rationale. Professor Schoettle concedes that this approach
leaves the field of education completely and would apply to all decisions of monetary
issues faced by local governing bodies. He also concedes that his constitutional
argument does not depend on poverty as a classification, but applies to all relative
taxpayer disadvantage. He concludes that his analysis would not compel absolute
equalization or elimination of local tax bases but only reduction of the gross wealth
disparities to the point where they no longer affect the electoral persuasiveness of
adherents to the same goal among different districts.
While provocative, the Schoettle thesis is ultimately unconvincing. It has all
the difficulties of the lack of a manageable judicial standard that Serrano and Proposition 1 rightly try to avoid. These same difficulties of measuring subtleties of differential political power are what compelled the United States Supreme Court to reject
an argument similar to Professor Schoettle's in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124
(1971), concerning at-large elections, even in a racial context. Moreover, his theory
would logically invalidate any number of things that affect electoral power unequally
including multimember districts, single-party districts, and the seniority and committee systems in legislatures. Finally, all the electoral cases that Professor Schoettle
cites involve inequalities among electors in the same political entity, that is, electors
competing for statewide decisionmaking influence. Thus in Baker v. Carr, the constitutional vice was unequal weighing, by district, of voters in relation to their
ability to influence the state legislature. Professor Schoettle's Serrano analysis,
however, expressly eschews such a rationale as being foreclosed by James v. Valtierra,
402 U.S. 137 (1971). His rationale, rather, is that electors of a poor district have
less internal district power than do those of wealthy districts. He thus posits lack
of pure horizontal equality of voters in different areas, with no racial or poverty
components and regardless of the issues involved, as a basis for invalidating the
universal American system of local government financing. This lack of horizontal
equality is said to make the system "irrational." Yet a system that provides that
local resources should be available to local government to finance its needs is clearly
not irrational.
120 See note 22 supra.
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Since the court's equal wealth standard allows for these continued
educational disparities, the essential concern of Serrano is not the
school child but the taxpayer. The California court has spawned a
new, but perhaps logically inevitable corollary to Proposition 1: The
economic burden of public education may not be a function of wealth
other than the wealth of the state as a whole. As such the principle of
Serrano cannot realistically be limited to education, but applies to all
burdens of taxation.

